Moscow has adopted a multifaceted and at times ambiguous strategy in Libya.  Observers have been quick to draw parallels the Kremlin’s involvement in Libya with its successful efforts to safeguard Russian ally President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria.  However, this assessment ignores the complexities of Moscow’s relationships with Libya’s warring factions and Russia’s seemingly contradictory military, diplomatic and economic activities in the country.

Superficially, Russia’s relationship with General Haftar looks a lot like its relationship with Assad, seeing as both are to varying degrees dependent on Russian support.  Haftar visited Moscow twice in 2016 and spoke with Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu via video call aboard the Admiral Kuznestov when the Russian aircraft carrier anchored near Tobruk in January 2017.  Russian mercenaries have fought alongside Haftar’s LNA forces since at least March 2019.

However, Russia has been reluctant to throw its full weight behind Haftar in Libya, as it did for Assad in Syria. Moscow’s official position is that of neutrality and Russian officials have met with representatives from both sides.  Russian military officials have engaged primarily with Haftar, whereas officials from Russia’s diplomatic and economic apparatus have simultaneously been reaching out to the GNA.

Tellingly, Moscow has not been transparent regarding its military support for Haftar to the international community. It is an open secret that the Wagner Group has close ties to the Kremlin. Nevertheless, the use of Wagner Group private military contractors (PMCs)to bolster Haftar’s forces still grants the Kremlin a sufficient degree of plausible deniability to maintain a workable relationship with the GNA.

President Vladimir Putin has denied claims that Russian PMCs/mercenaries are on the Kremlin’s payroll in Libya.  In January this year Putin commented that, ‘if there are Russian nationals there [in Libya], they do not represent the interests of, or receive funds from the Russian state.’

Following the October ceasefire, Russia together with Turkey, remain the most powerful foreign stakeholders in the Libyan Civil War. Haftar’s failure to capture the capital may have been a setback for Moscow, but Russia maintains a strong position. Russian PMCs are heavily concentrated around the strategically important city of Sirte. Operating from al-Jufra airbase, the LNA are well placed to repulse attacks by the GNA, with the help of Russian-built aircraft and experienced mercenaries.  A stalemate is therefore the most likely consequence of a resumption of hostilities.

If the permanent ceasefire is indeed permanent, Moscow still stands to benefit from the post-war settlement, despite Haftar’s failure to take Tripoli. Haftar’s forces are too well entrenched for the GNA to break the stalemate without a significantly costly Turkish-backed offensive. Multiple attempts by Moscow and Ankara to reach ceasefire agreements implies that neither side is prepared to commit the resources necessary to oust the other.  Instead, both sides seem content to informally divide Libya into Russian and Turkish zones of control.  These de facto zones would allow both actors to expand their base of influence in North Africa and further isolate the West from the region

Haftar may not be the Libyan equivalent of Assad, but the Kremlin still has enough leverage over him and the Tobruk-based government to sustain Russian influence in parts of the country controlled by the LNA. Presently, even with the ceasefire, Haftar is not going anywhere and the GNA will have to negotiate with the Tobruk government if they want a peaceful settlement. This will likely grant Moscow a significant degree of influence in any post-war arrangements.

Moscow’s backchannels with the GNA may even pay off if Tripoli wants to ease its dependency on Turkey in the years following a post-war settlement. This may facilitate Russian investment in the country, much of which was lost when Gaddafi fell from power. Of course, this is highly dependent on whether a permanent political settlement follows the ceasefire and whether the GNA are prepared to looks past the Kremlin’s military support for Haftar.

The Libyan Civil War presents an immediate threat on Egypt’s Western border and broader strategic threat to its strategic place in the regional balance of power.  President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s government are therefore anxious to influence an outcome in Libya that is favourable to Cairo’s interests, but must tread carefully, or else risk stretching Egypt’s already beleaguered security forces too thin.

Bordering a failed state which has descend into civil war is worrying enough – having a poorly defended border with that state is even worse.  Egypt’s border with Libya is a largely 1,100km (685 miles) long stretch of treacherous desert terrain, which is incredibly difficult to secure.

Cairo is nervous that Libyan troubles will spill across the porous border.  To some extent, they already have.  In June 2014, six Egyptians personnel patrolling the border were killed by Libyan smugglers.  The following year, ISIS militants kidnapped 21 Egyptian Christians and beheaded them.  In 2017, 16 Egyptian soldiers were killed and a further 13 injured when a security checkpoint on the border was attacked by Islamist militiamen.

The border threats are further compounded by Islamist terrorists operating in Egypt’s Sinai region.  Despite a significant deployment of troops, Cairo has not yet succeeded in significantly improving the security of the region.  Cooperation between militants in Libya and the Sinai-based jihadists could further destabilise Egypt’s already tenuous security situation.

On a wider scale, Egypt shares fears with the UAE and Saudi Arabia that Turkey are leveraging their support of the GNA in Libya to further project Turkish power across North Africa and the Middle East.  Relations between Cairo and Ankara have been souring since 2013, when Erdoğan condemned the coup which placed Sisi at the head of the Egyptian government.  The two strongman leaders have found themselves at odds again in Libya.

By backing Haftar and the LNA, Cairo is hoping to balance against these near threats to Egypt and those in the wider region.  In July, the Egyptian Parliament authorised the deployment of Egyptian forces outside of the country.  No explicit mention was made of Libya, but it was a clear signal that Egypt is considering a more assertive strategy, especially after Sisi’s sabre rattling the month before.

For now, aggressive posturing and rhetoric in Cairo is an unlikely portent for direct military intervention.  The Egyptian military has had a hard-enough time combatting the insurgency in Sinai – a battle within its own borders with easy access to lines of supply.  Thus, Libya seems like a step too far.

Instead, Egypt will have to wage a covert war in Libya.  Cairo can be expected to continue to supply weapons and training to militia groups aligned with the LNA.  Cairo can also deploy military assets in a limited manner, via the usage of special forces and air assets. At the same time, Egypt would do well diplomatically to coordinate political messaging with the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

The Libyan Civil War has provided the UAE with an opportunity to flex its muscles as a middle power and inadvertently move against its state and non-state rivals in the region.

Like their Saudi allies, the UAE have backed forces opposing the Muslim Brotherhood in Libya. Likewise, the UAE sees supporting various Libyan proxies as a means to weaken state-actor regional rivals like Turkey and Qatar. As such, a victory by Haftar and the LNA is in line with Emirati interests.

The UAE also has economic interests in the region. The Emiratis favour a strongman-style leadership in Libya; someone who could bring back a satisfactory degree of stability necessary for the conduct of good business. This would open Sirte's oil fields to Emirati investment.

Thus far, the UAE has conducted a significant aerial campaign, launching at least 850 drone and jet strikes against targets in Libya between April 2019 and 2020. The LNA have a deficit of modern aircraft, with most being around 40 years old.  Consequently, the UAE’s more advanced air assets have acted as a force multiplier for the LNA.

To facilitate aerial operations the UAE restructured the airbase of al-Khadim, just over 100km form Benghazi. Cargo planes have supplied an estimated 6,200 tonnes of weapons and ammunition to Emirati-backed forces.

The UAE have been active in covert diplomacy, too.  Reports first surfaced in April 2019 that the UAE has been financing Sudanese militias to fight against the GNA. This was likely made possible by a warming of relations between the two countries in 2016.

Although the UAE's strategic interests would be best served by an LNA victory, the Emiratis have allegedly provided support for Madkhali Salafis fighting on the side of the GNA because of their animosity towards the Muslim Brotherhood. This may serve the UAE well if Haftar cannot break the stalemate or the GNA prevail.

The Libyan Civil War has driven a further wedge between Qatar and its neighbours in the Arabian Peninsula, chiefly the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

Qatar extended its activities in Libya as the Arab Spring heated up in 2011.  The Qatari state-owned channel, Al Jazeera, stylised itself as a voice for revolutionaries in Syria and Libya.  The government in Doha went a step further and deployed the Qatari air force alongside several NATO members against Gaddafi’s loyalist forces.

Since Gaddafi’s fall, Qatar’s support for non-state actors in Libya has put it increasingly at odds with Saudi Arabia and the UAE.  Like Turkey, Qatar provides the GNA with funding, military training, logistics support, and diplomatic confidence.  However, since at least 2014, Qatar has provided support for Islamist militias operating in the west of the country, many of whom are affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. 

Qatari backing for Islamist militias is not limited to Libya and is partly the consequence of a broader strategic shift made around 2011.  As momentum grew behind the Arab Spring, Qatari leadership shifted the state’s primary foreign policy from supporting other states to supporting non-state actors, such as the militias in Libya and elsewhere.

The Arab Spring may have fallen short of propelling Qatari-backed groups to the top of the food chain, but Qatari backing has ensured that Doha can exercise greater influence over emergent centres of power.  Support for Islamists is driven less by ideology and more by pragmatism.  Qatar is a small state with a deficit in human resources, but it does possess a vast wealth derived from oil and natural gas.  Qatar has leveraged this wealth to buy influence in groups like the Muslim Brotherhood who have a strong base of support across the Middle East.  This grants Qatar greater influence and freedom of action beyond is own borders.  Qatar have approached the conflict in Libya with this rationale in mind.

Saudi Arabia’s primary security objectives in Libya are twofold.  First and foremost is the containment of expanding Turkish influence, of which Libya has become and important component.  Secondly, the leadership in Riyadh are anxious to prevent Libya from becoming another bastion for political Islam, which could threaten Saudi domestic stability on the long term if Islamists are subsequently emboldened across the wider region. 

Saudi Arabia’s strategic interests are better served by an LNA victory over the GNA.  After all, the GNA enjoy close relations with Turkey and could facilitate a prolonged Turkish military presence in North Africa.  At the same time, the GNA are supported by several Islamist militias whom Saudi Arabia would rather see subdued.

On the other hand, Haftar and the LNA are at odds with most of Saudi Arabia’s opponents in Libya.  Erdoğan's sustained support for the GNA has placed Haftar firmly against Turkish interests.  Although Haftar’s claims to be waging a campaign in the interests of counterterrorism are far-fetched – there are Islamists fighting on both sides – his forces are broadly aligned against some of Saudi Arabia’s principal Islamist foes, and for Riyadh, that is more than enough.  As the adage goes, the enemy of my enemy is my friend.  According to this logic, Saudi Arabia has allegedly pledged millions in support of Haftar.

Some Saudi interests overlap with those of other regional actors, not least their allies in the UAE, who have taken a more active role in Libya.  Farther from home, Riyadh perceives an opportunity to coordinate diplomatic efforts towards the Libyan issue.

To this end, the Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs Prince Faisal bin Farhan was dispatched to Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia in July 2020.  Egypt shares concerns over Turkish assertiveness and welcomed Saudi diplomatic affirmation for its ‘right to protect [its] western borders’, in light of foreign interference in Libya.  Algeria and Tunisia are more cautious and have concerned themselves more with the local threats posed by the Libyan Civil War than broader regional rivalries.  As such, they have not fallen in with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt in an effort to prop up the LNA.

For now, the Saudis are likely to take a back seat in the Libyan conflict.  The UAE and Russia have already taken more kinetic steps to support the LNA and Egypt have more at stake.  The Saudis are also deeply entrenched in Yemen, which demands greater attention from Riyadh than Libya.   Saudi Arabia will instead continue to supply significant financial aid and diplomatic support to shape a favourable outcome in the region.

FRANCE

France’s official position regarding the Libyan Civil War is to support UN-mandated efforts to end the conflict.  However, Paris has moved independently to secure French interests in the country.  These interests are primarily economic and security-driven.  Although France does not openly support Haftar and the LNA, its strategic decisions indicate a strong preference for Haftar to prevail over the GNA.

Like many EU-member states, France is anxious to restrict the flow of refugees and economic migrants from crossing the Mediterranean to reach Europe.  A persistently severe Islamist terror threat has heightened fears that terrorists are using these migration flows to enter France undetected. 

Libya has become an important transit point for migrants and the conflict has further contributed to the refugee crisis.  Having observed – and contributed to - the breakdown of central authority in the wake of the Arab Spring, policy makers in Paris believe that a firm hand will be needed to re-establish a stable security situation from which a wave of border crossings can be prevented.  Macron’s government are evidently convinced that Haftar will be more capable of this than the GNA.

France’s increasingly sour relations with Turkey, which have taken on a bitter personal dynamic between Macron and Erdoğan, further incentivises the Paris to support Haftar.  Paris has already made moves in the Eastern Mediterranean to protect Greek and Greek Cypriot interests from Turkish encroachment, in addition to safeguarding its own energy interests.  By supporting Haftar, France is hoping to prevent a decisive GNA victory which would facilitate Erdoğan’s ambitions to further project Turkish naval power across the Mediterranean and strengthen Turkey’s economic and diplomatic position.

France stands to gain economically if Haftar can consolidate his power in Libya.  French and Italian firms, Total and Eni, have been competing to secure access to petroleum reserves in southern Libya.  Italy’s albeit lukewarm support for the GNA has done little to endear the LNA towards Rome.  As such, Haftar’s seizure of Libya’s southern oil fields present an opportunity for the French to push the Italians out and take a more dominant role in the region’s oil industry.

To these ends, Paris has provided covert support for the LNA, likely consisting of military training, equipment, and weapons.  French support for Haftar may have begun as early as 2014, when a French military helicopter crashed near Benghazi, killing three of its special forces occupants.  The discovery of four Javelin antitank missiles of French origin which had been abandoned by retreating LNA troops stands as further confirmation of French support.

Although France has refrained from officially endorsing Haftar, Macron has invited him to several high-profile diplomatic events.  If the international community were to recognise the Tobruk-based House of Representatives, this would bolster Haftar’s position significantly and enable France to support the LNA more overtly.  Given Haftar’s failure to capture Tripoli, this now seems unlikely.

ITALY

As a former Italian colony, Libya has ranked highly on Rome’s foreign policy agenda since the early 20th century.  The civil war poses both economic and security concerns for Italy which far outweigh those faced by other EU-member states.

Approximately 10% of Italy’s energy requirements are met by production in Libya.  Eni, an Italian firm, are heavily invested in the country and manage the vitally important Mellitah gas complex, which exports 10 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually.  Further destabilisation of the security situation in Libya therefore threatens to hinder Italian economic interests.

The large flows of refugees and illegal migrants which have fuelled fears across Europe poses a particularly poignant security challenge for Rome due to Italy’s geostrategic location at the heart of the Mediterranean.  To this end, Rome has provided the GNA with roughly €50 million in funding to be spent on policing the Libyan coast where many migrants and refugees begin their journeys between North Africa and Europe.

Rome was initially well positioned to influence developments in Libya.  Having played a key role in the United Nations-led talks which culminated in the creation of the GNA 2015, and having helped install the GNA government in Tripoli the following year, Rome should have been primed to exercise influence over the GNA.

However, as Haftar and the LNA began to push westwards against the GNA, Italy adopted a diplomatic approach which was increasingly open to both sides.  Italian policy makers were rightly concerned that Rome would be side-lined if Haftar succeeded in capturing Tripoli.  This scenario seemed plausible until the GNA were able to repulse Haftar’s forces, largely thanks to Turkish support and the unilateral decision of Russian private military contractors to withdraw from Tripoli.

By recognising both major factions, Italy tried to position itself as a potential mediator in future negotiations.  The actual result was that Rome failed to establish a meaningful relationship with Haftar and alienated the GNA, who have increasingly relied on Turkish support to hold ground.

Rome has made moves to repair its relationship with the GNA.  For example, in June Italy provided the GNA with assistance clearing mines set by LNA forces before their withdrawal from the Tripoli offensive.  In July, Italy reached an agreement with the GNA to continue funding the Libyan coast guard to deter illegal migrants from crossing the Mediterranean.

Rome has officially welcomed the October ceasefire.  Providing the ceasefire is not broken, post-war negotiations may provide Italian diplomats with an opportunity to reassert Italian influence as mediators.  However, Italy may again be side-lined by more active external participants in the civil war who have gained greater leverage over their respective sides through the provision of military, diplomatic or logistical support.